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UNITED STATES GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION;  
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-05253) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 2, 2018 
Before:  SHWARTZ, KRAUSE and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 







 Mark Jackson appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting the defendants’ motion for summary 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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judgment in this action brought pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 
U.S.C. § 552, and the Privacy Act (PA), 5 U.S.C. § 552a.   
 In July 2016, Jackson filed FOIA/PA requests with the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) and the General Services Administration (GSA), seeking records pertaining to 
himself.  In particular, Jackson sought information related to his unsuccessful application 
for a job as an IRS revenue agent.1  After conducting searches in several databases, the 
agencies released in full 174 pages of responsive documents.  In his complaint, Jackson 
alleged that the agencies’ searches for responsive records were inadequate.  The 
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, and submitted declarations from the 
IRS and GSA employees who searched for records responsive to Jackson’s request.  The 
District Court granted the motion for summary judgment, concluding that the 
“Defendants have established as a matter of law that their searches were adequate and 
undertaken in good faith.”  Jackson v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin., 267 F. Supp. 3d 
617, 624 (E.D. Pa. 2017).  Jackson appealed. 
 We employ a two-tiered test in reviewing an order of a district court granting 
summary judgment in proceedings seeking disclosure under the FOIA.  First, we must 
“decide whether the district court had an adequate factual basis for its determination[;]” 
and, second, we must “decide whether that determination was clearly erroneous.”  
                                              
1 Initially, the IRS informed Jackson that he had been selected for the position, 
conditioned upon favorable suitability checks, including those related to his criminal 
history.  Later, however, the IRS withdrew its offer because a fingerprint check revealed 
pending criminal charges against Jackson. 
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Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 488 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(quotations, citations omitted).  Under this standard, we will reverse only “if the findings 
are unsupported by substantial evidence, lack adequate evidentiary support in the record, 
are against the clear weight of the evidence or where the district court has 
misapprehended the weight of the evidence.”  Id. (quoting Lame v. United States Dep’t 
of Justice, 767 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1985)).  Summary judgment may be granted on the 
basis of agency affidavits if they are specific and detailed, and if there is no contradictory 
evidence on the record or evidence of agency bad faith.  See Manna v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 51 F.3d 1158, 1162-63 (3d Cir. 1995); Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Dep’t of 
Defense, 831 F.2d 441, 444 (3d Cir. 1987).   
 Under the FOIA, an agency has a duty to conduct a reasonable search for 
responsive records.  See Oglesby v. Department of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 
1990).  The relevant inquiry is not “whether there might exist any other documents 
possibly responsive to the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was 
adequate.”  Steinberg v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 551 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (quoting Weisberg v. Dep’t. of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).  To 
demonstrate the adequacy of its search, the agency should provide “a reasonably detailed 
affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of search performed, and averring 
that all files likely to contain responsive materials … were searched.”  Valencia-Lucena 
v. United States Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1999).   
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 We agree that the defendants’ submissions in this case establish that the search 
was adequate and “reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.”  Oglesby, 
920 F.2d at 68.  The defendants submitted detailed declarations from a Government 
Information Specialist in the IRS’s Disclosure Office and from the GSA employee in 
charge of the “USAccess” system, which helps process identification cards for federal 
agencies.  Those declarations described Jackson’s request, identified the employees who 
were involved in the search, explained the search terms used, specified the systems that 
were searched, and stated that all files likely to contain responsive materials had been 
searched.  The IRS and GSA employees also submitted amended and supplemental 
declarations in response to specific complaints raised by Jackson in response to the 
motion for summary judgment.  For instance, in response to Jackson’s charge that the 
defendants failed to treat his request as arising under the Privacy Act, and thereby failed 
to conduct adequate searches, the amended declarations made clear that the defendants 
did not limit their searches, or withhold documents, on the basis that they were 
responding to only a FOIA request.  Furthermore, the supplemental declarations 
described additional searches that were conducted based on Jackson’s claim that the 
initial searches were inadequate.  In addition to the declarations, the defendants produced 
a chart that outlined each of the requested documents and the databases where Jackson 
believed those documents could be found, along with a corresponding description of the 
search methods and results.    
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 In his brief, Jackson alleges that the IRS failed to conduct a search of its “HR 
Connect” database.  According to Jackson, that database contains material that he 
submitted as part of his employment application.  Notably, however, the defendants 
searched for and located Jackson’s complete applicant file in a separate database used to 
store information pertaining to new hires.  That search was reasonably calculated to 
uncover the responsive documents, and Jackson’s “mere speculation that as yet 
uncovered documents might exist, does not undermine the determination that the agency 
conducted an adequate search for the requested records.”  Wilbur v. CIA, 355 F.3d 675, 
678 (D.C. Cir. 2004).   
 Jackson also complains that “there is no information provided as to the process 
used by [an IRS employee who works in Employment Operations] in choosing which 
databases to search.”  But that IRS employee adequately explained that she “chose to 
search the locations she searched based on her own personal knowledge of the files 
maintained in such systems.”  Cf. Spannaus v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 813 F.2d 1285, 1289 
(4th Cir. 1987) (holding that declarant’s attestation “to his personal knowledge of the 
procedures used in handling [the] request and his familiarity with the documents in 
question” satisfies “personal knowledge” requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
56).  Furthermore, contrary to Jackson’s contention, the search was not deficient simply 
because the IRS found additional documents in response to requests that Jackson made 
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during the District Court proceedings.2  See Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 953 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) (“[T]he additional releases suggest a stronger, rather than a weaker, basis for 
accepting the integrity of the search.”) (internal quotation omitted).   
 Jackson further complains that the defendants did not disclose emails which he 
believes must exist.  But an agency’s failure to locate every responsive record does not 
undermine an otherwise reasonable search.  Lahr v. NTSB, 569 F. 3d 964, 988 (9th Cir. 
2009) (“[T]he failure to produce or identify a few isolated documents cannot by itself 
prove the searches inadequate.”).  Jackson also argued that the declarations were deficient 
because they failed to explain “what search actually produced” four specific pages from 
the “USAccess” system.  To the extent that such an accounting is required, we conclude 
that the GSA employee in charge of the “USAccess” system adequately explained that he 
located those pages after using the “Applicant Status Report tool” to search “all files 
likely to contain responsive materials.”   
 Furthermore, we will not consider the new evidence that Jackson presents on 
appeal.  The Rules of Appellate Procedure state that the record on appeal consists of the 
“original papers and exhibits filed in the district court.”  Fed. R. App. P. 10(a).  Although 
Rule 10(e) allows the record to be supplemented, its purpose is to “correct inadvertent 
                                              
2 In response to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Jackson complained that 
the IRS did not search the Security Entry and Tracking System, the GovTrip database, or 
the SmartPay database.  While not conceding that its initial searches were inadequate, the 
defendants, “in a showing of good faith,” searched those records systems.  No responsive 
documents were located in the Security Entry and Tracking System.  Searches of the 
GovTrip and SmartPay database yielded responsive documents, totaling nine pages.    
7 
 
omissions, not to introduce new evidence.”  In re: Application of Ariel Adan, 437 F.3d 
381, 389 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006).  Accordingly, we “will not consider new evidence on appeal 
absent extraordinary circumstances.”  Id. (extraordinary circumstances are those that 
render the case moot or alter the appropriateness of injunctive relief, show a change in 
pertinent law, or demonstrate facts of which a court may take judicial notice).  Here, 
Jackson seeks to introduce “an email-chain” that was disclosed to him in connection with 
an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission proceeding.  He claims that the 
existence of the emails demonstrates that the defendants’ searches were inadequate.  We 
conclude that this does not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance for purposes of 
supplementing the record on appeal.  Moreover, even if we did consider the new 
evidence, it would not alter our determination that the defendants’ searches were 
adequate.  See Nation Magazine v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 892 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (“Of course, failure to turn up [a specified] document does not alone render the 
search inadequate.”).     
 Finally, citing the Privacy Act, Jackson asserts that the defendants should expunge 
“derogatory information” that appears in his employment application records.  The 
Privacy Act allows an individual to “request amendment of a record pertaining to him” 
on the basis that it is “not accurate, relevant, timely, or complete[,]” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(d)(2)(B)(i), and permits a court to order an agency to amend an individual’s 
record.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(A); Quinn v. Stone, 978 F.2d 126, 137 (3d Cir. 1992).  
Jackson does not identify the “derogatory information,” but it appears that he seeks the 
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removal of references to the criminal charges that were pending against him when he 
applied for the revenue agent job.  According to Jackson, those charges were later 
dismissed.  The District Court concluded that Jackson was not entitled to expungement 
because the records accurately reflected that his employment offer was rescinded based 
on the fingerprint check.  See  Jackson, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 624.  We agree.  “[T]he 
Privacy Act does not allow a court to alter records that accurately reflect an 
administrative decision, or the opinions behind that administrative decision.”  Reinbold v. 
Evers, 187 F.3d 348, 361 (4th Cir. 1999).  Although Jackson asserts that the “derogatory 
information was not accessed or used, at all, prior to the … improper disqualification 
decision made by defendant IRS,” he does not dispute that the information is accurate.  
Under these circumstances, he is not entitled to expungement under the Privacy Act.   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
Appellees’ motion to summarily affirm is denied as moot.  
